Kompensasi Berbasis Kinerja: Solusi pada Promosi dan Dinamika Kompetisi Internal Perusahaan
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.59603/masman.v2i2.684Keywords:
Competitive environment, Corporate incentives, Contract theory, Performance-based pay, Promotion riskAbstract
This study examines the challenges in applying contract theory, particularly regarding firm performance-based pay as a solution to promotion risk in a competitive environment. Performance-based compensation aims to enhance employee motivation and reduce promotion uncertainty, but it can also lead to unhealthy competition and undermine team collaboration. This study suggests that a balanced incentive contract design, which combines financial and non-financial rewards, can optimize individual performance without sacrificing team harmony. While performance-based pay can offer short-term benefits, it is important for companies to consider its long-term impact on employee satisfaction and collaboration within the organization. This research provides theoretical and practical insights for firms in designing fair and effective promotion systems.
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